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The Innkeeper's Tale: The Legal Development of a
Public Calling
David S. Bogen·
At nyght was come into that hostelrye
Wel nyne and twenty in a compaignye,
Of sondry folk, by aventure yfalle
In felaweshipe, and pilgrimes were they alle 1

Herry Bailly, Chaucer's ideal fourteenth-century host, would
never turn away a pilgrim if a bed could be found. 2 It is uncertain
whether this hospitality was also compelled by law, because English
law concerning innkeepers' obligations to their customers was just
beginning to develop during Chaucer's lifetime. This Article tells the
story of how innkeepers came to be liable for the losses of their
guests, how that liability became part of the common law, and how,
in turn, the public right of access to inns grew out of that liability.
The commonly accepted explanations for the development of the
public right of access to inns are untenable. According to one theory,
the right developed in response to the monopoly power of inns.3
This theory does not square with the facts. 4 Strict liability developed in the latter part of the fourteenth century when inns faced
serious economic pressures.5 The public right to accommodations
was firmly established by the beginning of the seventeenth century
when judges debated whether there were too many inns, not too

* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., 1962, LL.B.,
1965, Harvard University; LL.M., 1967, New York University. The assistance of the
staff at the University of Maryland School of Law library, particularly Maxine
Grosshans and Reuben Lee, was indispensable. A draft was presented at the University of Maryland School of Law Faculty Forum Workshop, and I appreciate the
comments made there. I would also like to thank for particular assistance my
colleagues Oscar Gray, the late Everett Goldberg, Tony Waters, and Gordon G.
Young.
1. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Canterbury Tales, in THE WORKS OF GEOFFREY
CHAUCER 17, 17 (F.N. Robinson ed., 2d ed. 1957).
2. Herry Bailly (or Harry Bailey) was the innkeeper in The Canterbury Tales.
Id. at 60.
3. Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust
Problem, 17 HARV. L. REv. 156, 157-61 (1903).
4. Edward A. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REV. 135, 141-49
(1914).
5. See discussion infra part II.C (discussing Black Death's effect on innkeepers).
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few. 6
According to another theory, offering services to the public was
an undertaking to serve all members of the public. 7 But that is not
so much a theory as a tautology. Innkeepers made no express promise to serve all comers, and an invitation to the public to request
services does not necessarily imply a promise to provide them.
When the court said innkeepers must serve the public, the obligation became an element of the status of an innkeeper; thereafter,
the act of becoming an innkeeper included undertaking that obligation. Why the court imposed the obligation in the first place remains a question.
A refinement of the public undertaking theory suggested an
analogy to public officeholders. 8 But there is no indication that innkeepers were considered similar to public officeholders when their
obligations were created. 9 Anyone could become an innkeeper.
Therefore, rooting the duty to serve in an analogy to public office
puts the cart before the horse. The analogy to public officeholders,
and thus the idea of a public calling, was a product of duties imposed rather than a cause of them.
The monopoly theory, the public undertaking theory, and the
public office analogy responded to an American debate at the turn
of the century over the government's power to regulate. Starting
from the premise that the government could regulate inns and carriers, lawyers and scholars constructed rationales to justify governmental regulation of other businesses. However, this "lawyer's history'' lost its reason for being when constitutional doctrine accorded
deference to any rational basis for government regulation. Once off
center stage in American constitutional thought, explanations for
the obligation to serve the public received little attention. Uncritically accepted, these explanations nonetheless continue to play a
role in justifying other legal theories. 10

6. Resolutions Concerning Innes, 123 Eng. Rep. 1129, 1129 (1624).
7. Charles K Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies (pt. 1), 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 515-16 (1911).
8. Id. at 521-22.
9. Burdick was influenced by references to a "public trust" and an innkeeper's
"profession of a public employment" in Chief Justice Holt's opinion in Lane v. Cotton,
88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1462-65 (1702). But Holt's characterization came at least a century after establishment of the duty to serve the public.
10. See Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1249-50
(1967) (discussing reformation of common-law principle governing enterprises "affected
with a public interest"); Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards
of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REv. 2033,
2043-44 (1987) (discussing public service exception to exclusion of punitive awards);
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It was, however, concern for criminal activity in the inn, rather
than any monopoly or innkeeper promise, that led to the obligation
to serve the public. The obligation supported the imposition of strict
liability on innkeepers and carriers for their customers' goods, a
liability that responded consistently with other contemporary police
measures to fears of criminal activity.
PROLOGUE

The earliest known inns in England were established by the
Romans during their occupation of Britain. 11 These inns made no
permanent mark on England, either physically or legally. Roman
institutions had virtually disappeared from England by the sixth
century. 12 But centuries later, Roman law returned as an object of
study. 13 Its solutions for legal problems provided a model in some
instances for English legal developments14 and, more frequently, a
basis for understanding the different direction that English law
took.
If Roman law applied to the first English innkeepers, their
freedom to refuse guests would have been linked to their liability
for guests' losses. Under Roman law, guests had at least two legal
actions against the innkeeper for damage to, or loss of, their goods.
For example, if their goods were damaged or stolen by the
innkeeper's employees, victims could recover double the value of the
goods from the innkeeper. 15 Even where the perpetrator was un-

Robert S. Trefry, Comment, Judicial Intervention in Admission Decisions of Private
Professional Associations, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 840, 846 (1982) (discussing departure
from nonintervention rule in admission decisions of private professional groups); Note,

The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1993,
1994-99 (1989) (discussing duty to serve and its relation to racial discrimination).
11. ANTHONY BIRLEY, LIFE IN ROMAN BRITAIN 50-51 (5th ed. 1976); FREDERICK
W. HACKWOOD, INNS, ALES AND DRINKING CUSTOllffi OF OLD ENGLAND 31-32 (1909);
!.A RICHMOND, ROMAN BRITAIN 91-92 (2d ed. 1963).
12. W. Senior, Roman Law in England Before Vacarius, 46 LAW Q. REV. 191,
192 (1930).
13. Id. at 191-206; PAUL VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE passim (1929); 8 FRANCIS DE ZULUETA & PETER STEIN, THE TE..<\CmNG OF ROMAN LAW
IN ENGLAND AROUND 1200, passim (Selden Society Suppl. Series 1990).
14. References appear throughout Bracton's thirteenth-century treatise on English law. Samuel E. Thorne, Introduction to 1 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOI\ffi
OF ENGLAND at xxxii-xl (George E. Woodbine ed. & Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968).
Litigants and judges made references to and discussed the Roman civil law in the
common-law courts of Edward II. Introduction to 4 FLETA, BOOK V AND BOOK VI at
xix-xx (G.O. Sayles ed. & trans., Selden Soc'y No. 99, 1984).
15. DIG. 47.5.1. (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18). The application of Roman law to provincial areas like Roman Britain is a complicated subject beyond the scope of this
Article.
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known, innkeepers were liable to their customers for the value of
stolen or damaged goods. 16 Travelers needed to trust innkeepers
and to give them custody of their property, 17 but a traveler may
have had difficulty learning of the innkeeper's reputation among his
neighbors. Strict liability protected travelers against untrustworthy
innkeepers. 18 It also assured victims of recovery even when it was
impossible to prove who committed the crime. 19
Justinian's Digest stated that strict liability was not too harsh
because the innkeeper could choose whether to accept the guest and
thus whether to assume the risk. 20 The innkeeper could also obtain
an agreement to limit liability, which was valid if made before the
entrance of the guest into the inn. The innkeeper who secured such
a waiver was liable only for negligence as bailee. 21 His ability to
reject guests who failed to agree to the waiver became a justification
for imposing strict liability on the innkeeper for loss or damage to
his guests' goods.
When the Roman troops were recalled from England, Roman
roads and inns fell into disrepair. The Roman governmental structure evaporated and Roman law faded from Britain. 22 With the
military gone, trade and communication with other areas diminished. Inns no longer appear in the surviving records. Today English inns trace their lineage no further than the eleventh century. 23
Travelers in the Middle Ages relied to a great extent on private
hospitality-the wealthy staying at the castles of other noblemen or
in religious houses, the poor in servant's quarters or with other

16. DIG. 4.9.2. (Gaius, Provincial Edict 5).
17. DIG. 4.9.1.1. (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 14).
18. "[U]nless this provision were laid down, there would be given the means for
conspiring with thieves against those whom they receive, since even now they do not
refrain from mischief of this kind." Id.
19. J.B.C. Stephen, The Water-Carrier and His Responsibility, 12 LAW Q. REv.
116, 119-20 (1896).
20. DIG. 4.9.1.1. (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 14); see David S. Bogen, Ignoring History:
The Liability of Ships' Masters, Innkeepers and Stablekeepers Under Roman Law, 36
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 354-60 (1992) (citing sources discussing justifications for
strict liability).
21. JOHN CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 226-27 (1967); MAx RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 255 (1927).
22. T.F.T. Plucknett, The Relations Between Roman Law and English Common
Law Down to the Sixteenth Century: A General Suruey, 3 TORONTO L.J. 24 passim
(1939); Senior, supra note 12, at 192. But see John F. Winkler, Roman Law in Anglo-Saxon England, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 101, 101-02 (1992) (discussing ways in which
Roman law returned to Anglo-Saxon England via the church after Roman departure).
23. PETER CLARK, THE ENGLISH ALEHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY 1200-1830, at
20-23 (1983); HACKWOOD, supra note 11, at 212, 224; W.A. Pantin, Medieual Inns, in
STUDIES IN BUILDING HisTORY: ESSAYS IN RECOGNITION OF THE WORK OF B.H. ST. J.
O'NEIL 166, 166 (Edward M. Jope ed., 1961).
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local villagers.24 Monasteries established guest houses to provide
accommodation for travelers. 25 Some of the guest houses became
public inns.26 Inns flourished on the continent in the twelfth century,27 and by the thirteenth century, as written records demonstrate, both reputable and disreputable inns were also well established in England. 28
The rise of trade29 and the breakdown of the feudal order30
put more people on the roads and created a demand for places to
stay. Lawlessness and disorder in the Middle Ages made travel
dangerous and shelter at night very important to those who had
goods that might be stolen. Bad roads made it desirable to travel
light and purchase food at the inn rather than attempting to bring
provisions. 31 The inn normally had a stable for the horses and provided food and shelter for the merchants, messengers, carriers,
small landowners, and other members of the middle class when
they travelled.32 By Chaucer's time, innkeeping was a thriving
business, and the law was forced to deal with the questions that it
raised.
I. THE LONDON LODGER'S TALE: William Beaubek v. John of
Waltham AND INNKEEPER LIABILITY IN LOCAL COURTS FOR THE
LOSSES OF THEIR GUESTS (1345)
Fourteenth-century London had many inns to accommodate the
visitors who came to the abbey and palace of Westminster.33 With
business to transact, whether secular or religious, the traveler
might well stay more than one night in a London inn. 34 The longer

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

CLARK, supra note 23, at 25-27.
HACKWOOD, supra note 11, at 59-60.

ld.
MARJORIE ROWLING, EVERYDAY LIFE OF MEDIEVAL TRAVELLERS 18 (1971).
RALPH V. TuRNER, THE KING AND His COURTS 133 (1968) (noting innkeeper

and his wife were accused of conspiring with robbers). A somewhat more distinguished inn was the Angel Inn at Blyth for which there is a record of a bill in 1274.
HACKWOOD, supra note 11, at 228-29.
29. See ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES

950-1350 (1971).
30. See WALLACE K FERGUSON, EUROPE IN TRANSITION 1300-1520, at 190-206
(1962) (discussing transition from medieval to modem civilization).
31. HENRY S. BENNETT, THE PASTONS AND THEIR ENGLAND 128-43 (1968); J.J.
JUSSERAND, ENGLISH WAYFARING LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 83-89, 149-57, 174-76
(Lucy T. Smith trans., 1925).
32. CLARK, supra note 23, at 5-6; JUSSERAND, supra note 31, at 125.
33. AR. MYERS, LONDON IN THE AGE OF CHAUCER 8 (1972).
34. Students of the law congregated together during term time which grew into
the system of training in inns of court. J.H. Baker, The Third University of England,
Address Before the Selden Society (July 4, 1990), in THE THIRD UNIVERSITY OF ENGHeinOnline -- 1996 Utah L. Rev. 55 1996
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stay and the likelihood of a return visit made it reasonable for travelers to seek redress in London for any injuries suffered at the inn.
The London lodger had access to a variety of courts. King's
Bench settled permanently in Westminster in 1339, and the Chancellor, the Exchequer, and the Court of Common Pleas were already
located there. But those bodies dealt with national business, and
they had enough business without worrying about a traveler's tribulations. Further, London jealously guarded the autonomy of its local
courts. 35 Routine writs 36 went to the Court of Hustings, while the
more flexible bill,37 or plaint, most frequently initiated actions in
the court of the mayor and aldermen. 38
Thus it was before the mayor and sheriffs of the city of London
that William Beaubek brought his bill in 1345, charging that his
goods were stolen from the room he had rented from John of
Waltham. 39 Beaubek claimed he had asked John for lodging in a
room where his goods would be safe. John, a "common innkeeper,"
showed him a room for an agreed weekly rate, "promised him that
all the goods he brought within would well be safe,"40 and gave

LAND: THE INNs OF COURT AND THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION 10-11 (1990); Introduction to READINGS AND MOOTS AT THE INNS OF COURT IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY at
xxvii-xxx (Samuel Thorne & J.H. Baker eels., Selden Soc'y No. 105, 1990).
35. Helen Cam, The Law Courts of Medieual London, in MEMORIAM WERNER
NAF: SCHWEIZER BEITRAGE ZUR ALLGEMEINEN GESCHICHTE (1960-61), reprinted in
HELEN CAM, LAW-FINDERS AND LAW-MAKERS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 85-94 (1962). In
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, jurisdiction of the royal courts was invoked only
with the king's consent and for good reason. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 27 (3d ed. 1990).
36. A writ is "a mandatory precept, issued by the authority and in the name of
the sovereign or the state, for the purpose of compelling the defendant to do something therein mentioned." BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3496 (8th ed. 1914). In this
context, the writ initiates the suit. A litigant could only obtain a writ in the form
the authority was willing to issue.
37. "A bill is a petition addressed directly to a court in order to commence an
action." BAKER, supra note 35, at 37; see Alan Harding, Plaints and Bills in the
History of English Law, Mainly in the Period 1250-1350, in LEGAL HISTORY STUDIES
1972 (Dafydd Jenkins ed., 1975).
38. A.H. Thomas, Introduction to CALENDAR OF EARLY MAYOR'S COURT ROLLS OF
THE CITY OF LONDON A.D. 1298-1307, at xiii-xxiii (A.H. Thomas ed., 1924) [hereinafter CEMR].
39. Beaubek v. John de Waltham, Corp. of London R.O., Plea and Memoranda
Rolls, A-5, m. 27 (1345), translated in ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE
OF THE BLACK DEATH, 1348-1381: A TRANSFORMATION OF GoVERNANCE AND LAW
377-78 (1993). Early cases cited in this Article were recorded in French. Citations,
where possible, are to English translations. An abbreviated version of Beaubek was
extracted in CALENDAR OF PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON,
A.D. 1323-1364, at 220-21 (A.H. Thomas ed., 1926) [hereinafter CPMR 1323--64], and
reprinted in A.K KIRALFY, THE ACTION ON THE CASE 236-37 (1951).
40. PALMER, supra note 39, at 377.
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him a key. Later, John witnessed William's receipt of twenty
pounds. William put ten marks of this in a strongbox in his room
which already held ten pounds worth of other goods. The next Tuesday, while William Beaubek was out, his doors were opened and his
strongbox was stolen. When William told John of the theft John
replied that he suspected Roger, the inn's brewer, of the theft, ''because this thing could not have been done without one of his servants."41 John advised William to keep the theft secret and assured
him he would get his money back. William alleged that, instead of
helping to catch Roger and restore the money, John ''by collusion"
chased Roger off and thus damaged William to the amount of twenty pounds. 42
The factual statements in Beaubek's bill provided a number of
potential grounds for recovery: promise of safekeeping, vicarious
liability, and even a hint that John was involved in the theft.
Beaubek's prayer for relief focused on still another ground-"that
every innkeeper is bound to answer to his guests for goods placed
under his control,"43 noting John was the only person who knew
Beaubek had the money. 44
Because the remedial request says the plaintiff "understands
that every innkeeper is bound," the claim in Beaubek "appears to
have been novel."45 The records of the mayor's court in this period
were not exhaustive-they contained only those actions the clerks
thought significant. 46 Beaubek's claim was one of these.
The principle of the bill in Beaubek, that "each innkeeper is
held to respond to his guests of the goods brought within their power," echoes the praetor's edict quoted in the Digest-"I will give an
action against . . . innkeepers . . . in respect of what they have received and undertaken to keep safe, unless they restore it."47 In
general, Roman law had little impact on the development of English
law, 48 but the identity of innkeeper liability rules suggests a
Roman influence on the insertion of this principle in Beaubek's
prayer for relief. 49

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. KlRALFY, supra note 39, at 151. Palmer translates the passage literally as
"he understands that each innkeeper is held to respond to his guests of the goods
brought within their power." PALMER, supra note 39, at 377-78.
44. PALMER, supra note 39, at 377-78.
45. KlRALFY, supra note 39, at 151.
46. Thomas, supra note 38, at vii.
47. DIG 4.9.1 (illpian, Ad Edictum 14).
48. R.C. VAN C.AENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO

GL.ANVILL 360-90 (Selden Soc'y No. 77, 1959); Plucknett, supra note 22, at 24.

49. Chief Justice Holt claimed that the principles of innkeeper and carrier liaHeinOnline -- 1996 Utah L. Rev. 57 1996
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The verdict stated that the goods and chattels were taken by
John ofWaltham's employees. Beaubek recovered judgment against
John de Waltham for ten marks together with damages and obtained an order to commit John to prison, presumably to compel
payment.5°
In the absence of a stated rationale for the judgment, the verdict that the theft was by an employee may have been crucial to liability. Surely the mayor's court found it easier to impose liability on
the innkeeper with a finding that his employee had stolen the
goods. Borough customs often held masters liable for the wrongdoing of their apprentices. 51 It was, therefore, no great legal leap to
find an innkeeper liable for theft committed by his servant. 52
The importance of Beaubek to the development of innkeeper
liability lies not in its facts or its verdict, but in the statement of
general principle in the prayer which made it possible to broaden
the decision for the future.
II. THE TALE OF THE KING'S DEPUTY ESCHEATOR: Navenby
Lassels AND INNKEEPER LIABILITY IN THE KING'S
COURTS FOR THE LOSSES OF THEIR GUESTS (1367)

v.

A. Novae Narrationes-Form for Innkeeper Liability in Mayor's
Court in London

The broadening of the principle in Beaubek can be traced in
Novae Narrationes, one of the earliest form books. It contains a

bility for loss in English law were borrowed from Roman law. Coggs v. Bernard, 92
Eng. Rep. 107, 107 (1703); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1463 (1702); see JoSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 487-95 (5th ed. 1851) (discussing innkeeper liability); see also WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN
LAW 54-55 (1938); RADIN, supra note 21, at 254. Radin and Burdick trace the law of
bailment to Roman law and cite WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 125 (Garland Publishing 1978) (1781), for this proposition. Jones compared the
two systems and pointed to Bracton's use of the Digest but did not specifically assert
that English law adopted Roman law. See id. at 14, 89-96.
50. PALMER, supra note 39, at 377-78. Damages were stated in the verdict as
40 shillings. Similarly, in a later case, the mayor and alderman "gave judgment by
the custom of the City for the amount claimed, with 40s damages, and committed
the defendant to prison till he paid." John Sapy v. Thomas Hostiller (1380), in CALENDAR OF PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON, A.D. 1364-1381,
at 260, 260-61 (A.H. Thomas ed., 1929) [hereinafter CPMR 1364-81].
51. 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 222 (Mary Bateson ed., Selden Soc'y No. 18, 1904).
52. The innkeeper's oath of 1381 spoke of overseeing the alien merchant's goods
"'in person or by a deputy so sufficient that you will answer for at your peril.'"
PALMER, supra note 39, at 377 (quoting CALENDAR OF LETTER-BOOKS . . . LETTER
BOOK D, CmcA 1309-1314, at 194 (Reginald R. Sharpe ed., 1902)); MUNIMENTA
GILDHALLAE LONDONIENSIS: LIBER ALBUS, LIBER CUSTUMARUM ET LIBER HORN (Henry
T. Riley ed., 1859) [hereinafter MUNIMENTA].
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form for recovery against innkeepers in the mayor's court in London
for goods stolen from guests:
To the mayor of London does John de W. etc. complain of G. de T.,
innkeeper, that whereas by [common] usage of the realm every
innkeeper is bound to guard and keep safe without loss or damage
the goods of those who leave their goods in their inns, there came
the said John and lodged with the said G. such a day etc., and on
the Tuesday next following a chest of the said John, being within
the inn of the said G., was broken into and ten marks in gold was
taken from the said chest and carried away; wherefore action accrued to the said John to demand the above-mentioned money from
the said G.; wherefore the said John has often come to the said G.
and asked him to make restitution to him, [but] he would not make
restitution and still will not, wrongfully and to his damages etc.53

Unlike the bill in Beaubek, this form is based on the "common
usage of the realm." 54 Thus it more closely resembles a later London case which alleged the "common custom of the realm that the
keeper of a hostelry was responsible for the goods and chattels
brought by lodgers to his hostelry." 55 Nevertheless, the facts of the
model are those of Beaubek-a bill of complaint to the Mayor of
London for a theft in the amount of "ten marks" that occurred on
the "Tuesday next" after taking up lodging. Even the plaintiffs
name in the form, "John deW.," seems taken from Beaubek where
John of Waltham was the defendant. These similarities suggest
Beaubek was the ancestor of the common usage. 56 Although the
verdict in Beaubek included reference to the wrong done by the
defendant's employee, the prayer for relief did not. Thus, the case
supported the proposition that liability for loss exists regardless of
who stole the goods.
The Novae Narrationes form demonstrates that the action
against the innkeeper in the local court was well accepted at an
early date. The exact date of this form is uncertain, but the reference to "usage of the realm" reflects the general acceptance of innkeeper liability in the king's courts that took place during the two
decades following the Beaubek decision. That acceptance was possible because strict liability was consistent with English law at the
time.

53. NOVAE NARRATIONES 332-33 (Elsie Shanks ed., Selden Soc'y No. 80, 1963).
54. Id. at 332.
55. CPMR 1364-81, supra note 50, at 260.
56. An unpublished version of Navenby v. Lassels, see infra Part II.D (discussing
Navenby), says that Chief Justice Knyvet referred to a decision in the London Guildhall which upheld such a claim against an innkeeper. KlRALFY, supra note 39, at
151.
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B. Medieval English Law and the Statute of Winchester
The Statute of Winchester, 57 in 1285, used third-party strict
liability to enforce the criminal law. The statute imposed liability on
the community for the losses of robbery victims when the perpetrator escaped58 and made hosts liable for their guests' behavior. 59
The first chapter of the Statute of Winchester complained that jurors let felonies committed on strangers pass unpunished to protect
offenders who might be their neighbors. 60 The statute responded
with a number of provisions to assure "that immediately, upon such
Robberies and Felonies committed, fresh Suit shall be made from
Town to Town and from Country to Country."61 The second chapter
of the Statute of Winchester punished the community for failure to
capture and present a felon. 62
The communal liability for damages made it easier to accept
the strict liability of the innkeeper. Damages were customarily
levied first against the most solvent inhabitants of the hundred. 63
The inn's owner was likely to be solvent and, therefore, likely to be
one of the persons who paid when robberies took place. In time, his
fellow citizens may have considered him the most appropriate person to pay damages when the robbery occurred in his inn. The hue
and cry normally involved assistance to a neighbor and victim compensation to a member of the community. Sharing a neighbor's loss
was likely more acceptable than paying for injury to a stranger. 64
The victimized guest at an inn was a stranger induced to stop by
the presence of the inn. If the innkeeper was responsible for the
victim being in the hundred, it would be fitting for the innkeeper to
bear the costs. 65

57. 13 Edw. (1285) (Eng.), reprinted in THE STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA
CHARTA TO THE END OF THE LAsT PARLIAMENT 230, 230-36 (Danby Pickering ed.,
1762) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE].
58. STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 57, at 231-32.
59. Id. at 232-33.
60. Id. at 230-31.
61. Id.
62. ld. at 231; see also 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 173
(Carl Stephenson & Frederick G. Marcham eds. & trans., rev. ed. 1972).
63. 4 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 521 (3d ed. 1945).
64. STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 57, at 230.
65. The hue and cry and the liability of the hundred were designed primarily to
enforce the criminal law rather than to compensate victims. The hundred was not
responsible for the recovery of lost goods, only for the capture and punishment of the
perpetrator of the crime. Further, victims were reluctant to raise the hue and cry
unless they or their friends saw the crime being committed because victims could be
held liable for disturbing the peace if they were wrong. Introduction to 2 BOROUGH
CUSTOMS at xxii (Mary Bateson ed., Selden Soc'y No. 21, 1906).
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While one provision of the Statute of Winchester imposed group
liability for crimes committed in the community, another made individuals liable for the behavior of their guests.66 This rule reflected
the tension between the obligations of hospitality and the need to
control outsiders. The stranger was not in frankpledge in the locality and thus would have no one to be responsible for his behavior. In
the twelfth century, the Assize of Clarendon prohibited giving lodging to an unknown for more than a night, and the Assize of
Northampton required the host to be legally responsible for any
stranger who stayed more than one night. 67
A city might control the behavior of its innkeepers, their
guests, and other persons within its gates, but there was always
concern that criminals might be harbored outside the city's reach.
The Statute of Winchester provided a national response to that
problem by imposing individual liability on persons outside of town
who housed strangers, requiring them to answer for their guests.68
Although the statute did not apply to inns within the town, it
was part of a legal environment in which it was appropriate for
hosts to be held responsible for the acts of their guests. This, in
turn, made it more acceptable to hold the innkeeper liable to a
guest for losses which might be caused by other guests.
While the Statute of Westminster provided a general legal
context for holding people responsible for criminal acts committed
by others, local law made innkeepers the object of specific regulation. For example, London ordinances prohibited foreigners from
keeping a lodging house, 69 required innkeepers to warn their
guests of the city's law against carrying arms, 70 and specified that
innkeepers must be good and sufficient people.71
Innkeepers were also subject to more general laws that had
particular relevance to their business. The sheriff might command a
person, especially an innkeeper, to provide lodging for members of
the king's court as they traveled with the king. 72 The mayor and

66. STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 57, at 232.
67. 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORY, supra note 62, at 79-80.
68. STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 57, at 232.
69. CEMR, supra note 38, at 7-12; MUNIMENTA, supra note 52, at 493.
70. CPMR 1323-64, supra note 39, at 154; CPMR 1364-81, supra note 50, at
146; MUNThiENTA, supra note 52, at 388.
71. MUNThiENTA, supra note 52, at 721. The entry is in a table of records and
refers to the full regulation in Letter Book F, a register of city records from 1338 to
1353.
72. It was one of the privileges of London that the Crown could not seize lodgings of its citizens for their own purposes. MUNThiENTA, supra note 52, at lviii-lix.
But that did not prevent cooperation between the sheriff and the crown to assure
lodgings for those who needed it. See Vilers v. LeGros (1298), in CEMR, supra note
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aldermen regulated the price and quality of bread and ale that
innkeepers and others sold. 73
New obligations imposing responsibility on innkeepers for their
guests were less startling in such a regulatory environment. Further, the innkeepers in London already had some obligation to care
for their guests' goods. As early as 1318, London innkeepers swore
to "mind and work as far as you well may to be privy and oversee
all manor of merchandise that any alien merchant who is under
your said innkeeping and oversight has and shall have coming hereafter into his possession."74 Beaubek's ambiguity on the nature of
the innkeeper's liability moved the duty of care toward the strict
standard found in Roman law.
All of these English institutions-community liability for failure
to raise or pursue the hue and cry and for failure to capture robbers, the liability of hosts for strangers who stay with them beyond
one day, and specific innkeeper regulation-made the strict liability
principle acceptable. The innkeeper's liability for his guests' losses
was new, but it was consistent with these existing legal traditions.
C. The Black Death-Impetus for Change
Three years after the decision of Beaubek v. Waltham, the city
of London was transformed by the plague, commonly known as the
Black Death. The enormous death toll following the first plague and
its subsequent episodes contributed to the nationalization of the law
affecting innkeepers. The plague created a labor shortage that encouraged laborers to leave their positions in search of better. Prices
rose for everything, including basic foodstuffs. This led to attempts
to regulate prices and restrain movement. Previously, regulation of
the quality and price of bread and ale had been enforced sporadically through the local assizes of bread and ale. 75 Now concern over
food prices reached a national level. The Ordinance of Labourers in
1349 and the Amendment to the Statute of Labourers in 1353 were
the first nationally promulgated and nationally enforced laws controlling victuallers. 76 In this way, the Black Death contributed to

38, at 31 (referring to sheriffs securing king's lodging).
73. Thomas, supra note 38, at xxvii, 12-13, 24-25; MUNIMENTA, supra note 52,
at 359-61.
74. PALMER, supra note 39, at 377.
75. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HisTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I at 559, 581-82 (2d ed. 1923) (1895); 2 id. at
519-20; see BERTHA H. PuTNAM, THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTES OF LABOURERS
DURING THE FIRST DECADE AFTER THE BLACK DEATH 1349-1359, at 155 (1908) (discussing methods of enforcement of assizes of bread and ale).
76. Ordinance of Labourers, reprinted in PuTNAM, supra note 75, app. at 8-12
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the context in which royal courts considered the behavior of innkeepers a matter for national concern.77
Professor Robert Palmer, who has carefully detailed the transformation of English law after the Black Death, argues that the
plague spawned developments in the common law to provide remedies for performing work poorly. He speculates that inns lost customers due to the declining population and that those losses led
innkeepers to cut corners and drop standards to remain in business.
Palmer asserts that deterioration in standards led to government
action imposing liability on innkeepers for the loss of their guests'
goods. 78
This explanation is incomplete at best. First, the assumption
that the number of inns remained the same while, overall, fewer
travelers used inns may not be true. For example, travel by government officers probably held constant while the number of pilgrims
remained steady or even increased.79 Palmer acknowledges the increased affluence of travelers may have encouraged more traveling
and permitted a larger proportion of travelers to avail themselves of
inns.80 Indeed, to the extent Palmer is right about increasing pressures on innkeepers, the pressure may have come from an increase
in the number of innkeepers rather than a decrease in the customer
base. There is some suggestion that the number of alehouses rose
after the Black Death and that by affording food and occasional
lodging these alehouses brought establishments with significantly
lower standards into the business and increased competition for
customers. 81

(1353); Statute Against Violators of Ordinance of Kings Council, in PUTNAM, supra
note 75, at 17.
77. Professor Norman Arterburn argued that the obligation to serve the public

at a reasonable price arose to deal with the bargaining power of laborers and tradesmen after the sharp population drop caused by the Black Death and that the obligation was enforced through the penal law. Norman F. Arterburn, The Origin and First
Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411, 421-24 (1927). Citing the Statutes of
Labourers, he argued that the duty to serve was placed upon all trades and callings
during the time of the Black Death because when laborers and tradesmen were in
such short supply they could exact any price they pleased. Id. at 421-22.
It was not until nearly a century after the Black Death, however, that the
first decisions on the obligations to serve all members of the public appeared.
Arterburn could not identify any statute regulating innkeepers' lodging of guests. The
duty to "serve" applicable to other occupations under the Statutes primarily involved
an obligation to remain in the same occupation or work for the same employer, not a
duty to serve the public.
78. PALMER, supra note 39, at 253.
79. PHILIP ZIEGLER, THE BLACK DEATH 268 (1969).
80. PALMER, supra note 39, at 253.
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Second, Palmer contends that lack of competition produced
poorer quality workmanship in other occupations. 82 Pursuant to
that reasoning, competition for customers should have raised innkeeper standards rather than lowering them. The response of lower
standards would be appropriate only if price was more important
than standards. The price of foodstuffs was regulated separately
and lodging was not a significant proportion of the total cost. Thus
price competition seems unlikely. Nevertheless, some innkeepers
may have had less money for maintenance of their property, resulting in less secure rooms. Further, innkeepers may have had less
control over staff because help may have been more difficult to
retain. Whether standards in fact rose or fell is simply unclear.
Third, Palmer's theory that lower inn standards led to the
government imposing liability on innkeepers for guests' losses is
untenable because the court applied strict liability to innkeepers.
The court imposed liability for negligence in response to falling
standards in other occupations. 83 Poorer innkeeper performance
alone, therefore, cannot explain the choice of strict liability rather
than negligence.
A more likely explanation for the imposition of strict liability on
innkeepers is the apparent rise in crime following the Black
Death. 84
Contemporary chronicles abound in accusations that the years
which followed the Black Death were stamped with decadence and
rich in every kind of vice. The crime rate soared; blasphemy and
sacrilege was a commonplace; the rules of sexual morality were

fied as a common inn. Recognizing the loose use of terms (people calling alehouses
inns and inns alehouses), Clark distinguished inns, taverns, and alehouses, noting
that "[t]his three-fold categorization was recognized in statute and common law from
the sixteenth century in the way that premises were licensed and the legal obligations of their landlords defined." CLARK, supra note 23, at 5.
Clark claimed that the liability of the innkeeper for loss or damage to the
goods of his guest was in exchange for exemption from the licensing controls on the
sale of alcohol imposed on alehouses. Id. at 10. This is mistaken because alehouse
licensing was a product of the sixteenth century when innkeeper liability was already
well established.
82. Palmer argues that Chancery responded to this problem with early writs of
assumpsit that began in the 1350s. PALMER, supra note 39, at 169-70. Procedurally,
Palmer explains the activity of Chancery by a proclamation of 1349 that directed
petitioners to bring their problems to the chancellor first because the plague had
forced the cancellation of Parliament and the king was busy with other matters. Id.
at 108.
83. Id. at 169-70.
84. The incidence of homicide from 1349 to 1369 in England was about twice
that of the period 1320 to 1340 despite the population decrease. ROBERT S.
GoTTFRIED, THE BLACK DEATH: NATURAL AND HUMAN DISASTER IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE

97-98 (1983).
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flouted; the pursuit of money became the be-ail and end-all of
people's lives.... When Langland dated so many of the vices of the
age "sith the pestilens tyme" he was speaking with the voice of
every moralizer of his generation.85

As long as people believed society to be more dangerous and
threatening, they would be anxious to take steps to deal with the
problems. Individuals were likely to feel most exposed when traveling outside of their home area. Strict liability for the innkeeper
helped allay this anxiety.
Innkeepers were sometimes suspected of misbehavior. Duplicate keys could be slipped to a thief, the whereabouts of the lodger
communicated to crooks, or the thief lodged in the same room as the
victim on the pretense of overcrowding. An innkeeper and his wife
were accused of conspiring with robbers as early as 1229.86 In the
next century, Chaucer's Canterbury Tales noted the danger of connivance when the parson attacked individuals who encouraged the
evils of their subordinates "as thilke that holden hostelries,
sustenen the thefte of hire hostilers."87 Beaubek hinted at this
when he noted that the innkeeper colluded to chase off the suspected thief and that the innkeeper was the only one who knew of the
money in the strongbox.
Someone in the inn must have caused the loss-the innkeeper,
his servants, other guests, or outsiders breaking into the place-and
the innkeeper was the person in the best position to make sure such
a loss did not occur. The imposition of liability on the innkeeper
made the inns safer by discouraging connivance with robbers. The
stricter the. liability, the greater the likelihood innkeepers would
take measures to ensure crime did not occur on their premises.88
This strict liability apparently did not impose too great a cost on the
inn's operations. 89

85. ZIEGLER, supra note 79, at 271.
86. TURNER, supra note 28, at 133.
87. CHAUCER, supra note 1, at 241.
88. According to Holdsworth, the ability of the poorer inhabitants to avoid payment led to the neglect of their duty to pursue criminals. 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
63, at 521.
89. The price of a bed was among the smallest of the charges at the inn, well
below the price of food. JUSSERAND, supra note 31, at 126. But innkeepers sometimes
did use their strategic position to their own ends. Travellers complained of excessive
prices for food, and Edward ill promulgated statutes to fix prices with no great
success. See id. at 125-26 (discussing Edward III's attempts at keeping inn food
costs reasonable).
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D. The "Custom of the Realm"-Navenby v. Lassels
On October 5, 1367, Thomas of Navenby, deputy escheator of
the king in Northampton shire, stopped on his way to London at the
inn of Walter Lassels in Huntington. 90 William of Stanford, managing the inn while Walter was out of town, furnished Thomas and his
servants with a room with a lock. 91 That night thieves broke into
the room and robbed Thomas of both his own goods, worth four
pounds, and of nine pounds he had collected for the royal treasury.
The robbers apparently escaped, so Thomas's only hope of recovery
was to sue his host. His suit is one of the earliest recorded cases in
the royal courts on the liability of innkeepers to their guests and
the first to assert "custom of the realm." 92
Royal courts in Westminster probably knew of the Beaubek
decision in the mayor's court. 93 But even if the innkeeper should be
held liable, the recognition of a right to sue him in the king's court
was another matter.
1. The Propriety of the Writ

Cases were brought in royal courts through a writ obtained
from the chancellor's office. 94 None of the usual writs quite fit

90. The report specifies that the inn was in the town of "Cant.," which Fifoot
says is Canterbury. C.H.S. FIFOOT, HisTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW:
TORT AND CONTRACT 75, 80-81 (1949). The writ, however, says the innkeeper is of
"Huntingdon," and the accounts in the Assize Yearbook likewise specify that the inn
was in "Huntingdon." See Assize Yearbook, Y.B. 42 Ass., fol. 260b, pl. 17, translated
in Coram Rege Roll, No. 428 (1367) m. 73., in 6 SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF
KING'S BENCH 152, 152-54 (G.O. Sayles ed., Selden Soc'y No. 82, 1965) [hereinafter 6
KING'S BENCH]; J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MU.SOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HisTORY:
PRivATE LAW TO 1750, at 552, 552-54 (1986); A.KR. K!RALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF
ENGLISH LAW 202, 202-04 (1957).
91. Navenby v. Lassels, Coram Rege Roll, No. 428, m. 73 (1367), reprinted in 6
KING'S BENCH, supra note 90, at 152, 153.
92. Introduction to 1 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS FROM THE KING'S COURTS
1307-1399, at lxvi (Morris S. Arnold ed., Selden Soc'y No. 100, 1985) [hereinafter 1
SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS]. Palmer noted that Chancery issued a writ in assumpsit
to an innkeeper for loss of a guest's goods and another writ in 1367 for forcible ejection from an inn. PALMER, supra note 39, at 165.
93. See KmALFY, supra note 39, at 151. Of course, Justice Knyvet may have
been referring to a decision of the King's Council and the yearbook author may have
confused the Guildhall with Westminster. See infra note 108 (discussing possibility of
Knyvet being misquoted). But confusion was possible only if a judge of the King's
Bench was likely to be familiar with significant decisions in the city.
94. The writ was issued to the sheriff to bring the defendant to answer in the
king's court. See Baker, supra note 35, at 49-52. The writs were issued by a bureaucracy that channeled them into specific forms. The categories of writs subsequently
affected legal thought. "The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us
from the grave." F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (A.
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Thomas Navenby's situation. Covenant, detinue, and other writs
appropriate for business relationships were unsuitable for this problem. Covenant was available only for a promise under seal. 95 Detinue was available only for specific goods in the possession of the
defendant, and the innkeeper never held Thomas's goods. 96 Further, detinue was not an attractive form of action because a defendant had a right to wager at law. 97
Chancery had issued a writ in 1365 against an innkeeper for
the losses of his guest, but its form posed problems for Navenby.
That writ stated that the plaintiff had placed his horse and chattels
in an inn, that the innkeeper undertook ("assumpsisset") to keep
them safe, and that they were stolen "by default of D's due guarding.',gs The claim probably reflected the loss of horse and saddle-both of which would have been placed in the inn's stables under the innkeeper's control. A writ derived from bailments alleging
an undertaking might have been appropriate for goods delivered to
an innkeeper for safekeeping,99 but Navenby kept the goods in his
room. Any obligation concerning goods a traveler left in his room
was incidental to providing a room and unlikely to be the subject of
any express undertaking. Further, similar writs for other occupations applied to negligent injuries inflicted by the defendant while
the harm to Navenby was done by a third person and the defendants denied any negligence. 100 Thus the bailment-derived assumpsit was not appropriate.
Thomas of N avenby chose to seek a writ of trespass. 101 This
Chaytor & W. Whittaker eds., 1962) (1909).
95. Milsom suggests the seal was in part a device of jurisdiction allocation.
S.F.C. M!LSOM, HisTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COl\fi\10N LAw 248-49 (2d ed. 1981).
96. Detinue was, however, the appropriate action to recover goods from a bailee,
even if the bailee lost the goods or they had been stolen. Milsom suggests theft
excused a bailee in the fourteenth century but not in the fifteenth. MILSOM, supra
note 95, at 371-72; see also FlFOOT, supra note 90, at 157-60 (discussing dispute
over fault as relevant to bailment).
97. HAROLD POTTER, POTTER'S HisTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND
ITS INSTITUTIONS 318-19 (A.KR. Kiralfy ed., 4th ed. 1958). A party "waged his law"
by having a certain number of persons swear on his behalf. Where cases were heard
before the royal courts in Westminster in London, the party could wage his law by
hiring professional oath takers who knew nothing of the matter.
98. PALMER, supra note 39, at 378, A19a.
99. See id. at 211 (describing how some forms of assumpsit writ originated with
law of bailments).
100. Id. at 254.
101. A writ would not issue unless requested. See id. at 304. Palmer has shown
that Chancery exercised broad discretion in issuing the writs and did not simply act
ministerially. Id. "The crucially important argument in the beginnings of many new
fourteenth-century remedies took place in chancery by convincing the clerks to issue
a new form of writ, an argument in which the attorneys were involved, but not the
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writ had a number of procedural advantages. Growing out of the
criminal process, the trespass action usually entitled the plaintiff to
have the defendant appear in court and to have the merits of any
factual issue decided by a jury. 102 At least on the face of the writ
and pleadings, trespass did not involve negligence. 103 But trespass
too did not seem to fit Navenby's case. Most trespass writs were for
direct injuries and stated that the trespass was vi et armis (by force
and arms) and contra pacem (against the peace). Trespass lay
against the robbers, but the innkeeper's failure to prevent the robbery was not so clearly a trespass. The innkeeper's behavior was
simply nonfeasance and could not reasonably be described as vi et
armis or contra pacem.
The usual writ of trespass issued by the Chancery was a form
with no place for discussion of the facts of the case. Without an explanation, however, nothing on the writ's face indicated the defendant was liable for a theft done by others. Thus, Navenby needed a
writ that incorporated a statement of the case. Further, Navenby
had to convince the court to accept the writ without any showing
that the defendant had acted against the peace.
It was not unknown for the Chancery to include in the writ a
statement of the circumstances that provided the basis for liability.
A number of trespassory writs did not involve a breach of the peace
or forcible action by the defendant against the plaintiff. 104 After
the Black Death, Chancery issued such writs for new situations.
Nevertheless, new writs were decided on a case-by-case basis, and a
plaintiff seeking a remedy for an indirect or consequential injury
faced a difficult challenge. 105 The plaintiff not only had to per-

se:rjeants." Id. at 298. It is not clear, however, what impact the attorney had on the
wording of new writs. Chancery clerks may have responded to a party's statements
of injury with appropriate writs, by creating new writs according to chancery policy,
or by requiring parties to specify the writ requested and requiring the requesting
party to draft any new writ before deciding the policy question of whether it should
be issued.
102. BAKER, supra note 35, at 71. Justice Knyvet refused to order the defendants'
arrest to bring them before the court in Navenby because the crux of the action did
not allege fault. See infra note 103.
103. Negligence was not recognized in the pleadings of trespass in 1367 where
factual issues were resolved by a jury rather than by wager at law. Plaintiff sued
defendant for causing injury and defendant responded not guilty, thus concealing the
nature of the facts and the problem of fault. MILSOM, supra note 95, at 345-46.
104. Even before the plague, writs existed for failure to repair river or sea walls
or for violation of an individual's franchise to operate a market. Id. at 258, 262;
PALMER, supra note 39, at 283-93.
105. In his discussion of trespass on the case, Palmer notes that the extension of
liability to farriers for laming horses initially used the traditional trespass vi et
armis form. PALMER, supra note 39, at 225. A form that might be recognizable as
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suade the authorities that a wrong had been done, he also had to
persuade them it was a wrong of which the king should take cognizance. Even if the plaintiffs attorney persuaded Chancery to issue a
writ, the court could refuse to accept it. 106
In Navenby's case, both Chancery and the court supported him.
Perhaps the issue had been decided before he had even made his request. The King's Council may have previously responded to a luckless traveler's petition.107 According to one version of Nauenby,
"[Justice] Knyvet said that such a case had been decided some time
before in the Council, and the reason for the judgment was that the
innkeeper must answer for himself and his staff for the rooms and
stables."108 In any event, the writ N avenby obtained stated that
the innkeepers' obligation to look after their lodgers' goods was
already established "according to the law and custom of the king's
realm."
[W]hereas according to the law and custom of the king's realm
innkeepers who keep common inns for the accommodation of men
travelling through the districts where such inns are situated and
staying in them, are bound to look after the goods of those who stay
in the said inns, night and day without impairment or loss, so that
through the negligence of the innkeepers or their servants loss may
not in any way befall such guests ....109

This ''law and custom of the king's realm" was recent and quite
debatable. 110 The factors leading to the imposition of liability on
innkeepers did not guarantee the ultimate result. The assertion
that it was "the law and custom of the realm," however, became one
of the normal methods of formulating the writ of trespass on the
case. This suggests the writ of trespass was no longer a special
decision for a particular case but rather referred to a larger princitrespass on the case was not established for negligence with respect to fire until
1371, id. at 275, and for writs against jailors in 1369, id. at 265-66. The few miscellaneous cases Palmer cites were special writs. Id. at 268-71.
106. See, e.g., The Miller's Case, Y.B. 41 Edw. 3, fol. 24, pl. 17 (1367), translated
in F!FOOT, supra note 90, at 80, 80 (denying relief to plaintiff who claimed miller
improperly charged toll because plaintiff used wrong writ).
107. The King's Council was a body which, inter alia, considered petitions addressed to the king for extraordinary relief. See Baker, supra note 34, at 113-14.
108. Navenby v. Lassels, Y.B. 42 Ass., fol. 260b, pl. 17 (1368), reprinted in BAKER & M!LSO:M, supra note 90, at 552, 553-54.
Of course, Justice Knyvet may have been referring to Beaubek and been misquoted. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing case whose facts
and names suggest it may be Beaubek).
109. Navenby v. Lassels, Coram Rege Roll, No. 428, m. 73 (1367), reprinted in 6
KING'S BENCH, supra note 90, at 152, 152-53.
110. See PALMER, supra note 39, at 254-56 (noting controversy over issue of
strict liability).
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ple of decision.
The writ the Chancery issued in Navenby's case kept close to
the traditional form for trespass. It retained the averments of trespass vi et armis and contra pacem by phrasing the body of the requested writ in terms of the injury done by the thieves. The only
nontraditional element of Navenby's writ was a clause blaming
innkeeper Walter Lassels and his manager, William Stanford, for
the robbery:
[C]ertain malefactors, through negligence on the part of the said
Walter and William, with force and arms broke at night into a
room in which Thomas, on a journey to London on the king's business, was accommodated within such an inn of Walter's at Huntington, and they took and carried away Thomas's goods and chattels, found there, to the value of four marks as well as nine pounds
of the king's money which were there in the said Thomas's keeping,
and they inflicted other outrages upon him in contempt of the king
and to his loss and to no slight expense and grievance of the said
Thomas and in contravention of the peace etc.m

The crucial question was whether the king's court should decide such cases, but here the King's interest in obtaining redress for
the specified injury was apparent on the face of the writ-violence
was done and the king's money was taken.

2. The Advantages of Royal Jurisdiction
The increasing concern with local trade practices following the
plague encouraged jurisdictional growth in the king's courts generally, but the special characteristics of Navenby made it peculiarly
suited to the royal court's jurisdiction. Victims of theft in inns preferred royal justice because the disputes involved local businesses
and outsiders passing through. Thus, local courts were likely to be
inconvenient and biased against the stranger.
In Navenby's situation, the local court was also inappropriate:
most of the money stolen belonged to the king. The royal court was
better suited for recovery of the king's sums, even though Navenby's
claim for personal sums did not clearly fit the Exchequer's jurisdiction. King's Bench had jurisdiction in trespass actions for theft, and
Navenby's personal losses exceeded the forty shilling minimum
needed to get into the royal courts. 112 By letting N avenby bring

111. Nauenby u. Lassels (1367), reprinted in 6 KING'S BENCH, supra note 90, at
152, 153.
112. Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw., ch. 8 (Eng.), in STATUTES AT LARGE,
supra note 57, at 123. Writs of trespass were not granted for cases involving damage
to goods of less than 40 shillings, leaving them to be brought in shire court. Id. The
HeinOnline -- 1996 Utah L. Rev. 70 1996

No.1]

THE INNKEEPER'S TALE

71

trespass in this case for innkeeper liability, the court could provide
a new source for recovering stolen royal money.

3. The Decision
Although the writ referred to the innkeeper's negligence (jJer
defectum), Thomas of Navenby demurred to William of Stanford's
answer that he was not negligent. He also demurred to Walter
Lassel's answer that he was not liable because he was out of town.
The Court of King's Bench upheld the demurrers and awarded damages to Thomas, saying that an innkeeper must pay for the robbery
of a guest even if the innkeeper is not at fault.
In Navenby v. Lassels, King's Bench Chief Justice Knyvet de:nied a request for a writ of Capias ad Satisfaciendum to arrest
defendants until they satisfied the judgment. ,Knyvet noted that
capias was not available against the hundred for damages under
the statute where the hue and cry is raised and reasoned that the
same should be true for innkeepers who had to pay for their
customers' losses because, like the hundred, "they are charged by
law and not for fault.'m 3
Navenby was one of the leading cases in the latter half of the
fourteenth century in the development of trespass on the case. Although not the first successful action on the case, 114 it foreshadowed a greater willingness on the part of Chancery to issue and the
court to accept such actions. It was a short step from a writ that
clearly indicated the defendant had not broken the peace to a writ
that abandoned the allegation of breach of the peace altogether. The
actions of the court in the next few years demonstrated this. 115
statute did not prevent local courts from hearing cases involving more than 40
shillings. See John S. Beckerman, The Forty-Shilling Jurisdictional Limit in Medieual
English Personal Actions, in LEGAL HisTORY STUDIES 1972, at 110, 110-17 (Dafydd
Jenkins ed., 1975).
113. Navenby v. Lassels, Y.B. 42 Edw. 3, fol. 11, pl. 13 (1368), translated in
K!RALFY, supra note 90, at 204, 205. The hue and cry action was appropriate for
royal courts pursuant to the statute, which may have suggested that innkeeper liability involving theft be an issue for royal courts as well.
114. According to Fifoot, Nauenby was the first successful action on the case.
FIFOOT, supra note 90, at 75. However, Palmer cites a variety of successful writs
that employed a form which stated the circumstances of the case and requested relief
for indirect or consequential damages, but that was otherwise identified with trespass. Only a few of these earlier writs had records of pleadings and a decision by a
court on their form. PALMER, supra note 39, at 377-78.
115. A number of cases are commonly discussed in casebooks on the development
of the action on the case. See, e.g., The Surgeon's Case, Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, fol. 6, pl. 11
(1375), reprinted in BAKER & Mru30M, supra note 90, at 360; Toundu u. Mareschall
(1375), reprinted in PALMER, supra note 39, at 226 n.36, app. at 368; The Farrier's
Case, Y.B. 46 Edw. 3, fol. 19, pl. 19 (1373), reprinted in S.F. CHARLES Mru30M,
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E. Innkeeper Defenses
Defendants developed three lines of defense to innkeeper liability suits after Navenby: (1) the plaintiff didn't lose the goods; (2) the
goods were stolen by someone for whom the plaintiff was responsible; or (3) the defendant was not in the innkeeping business. As
Judge Morris Arnold's work demonstrates, suits often went to a jury
for decision without a ruling on the substantive law, and these defenses emerged only gradually. 116
Plaintiffs naturally followed Navenby's successful form which
contained the allegation of fault. Surprisingly, defendants often followed Lassel's losing form, pleading that plaintiffs lost nothing by
defendants' fault. 117 The judges allowed this double plea, and some
cases went to the jury on these pleadings. 118 The parties may have
understood from the preamble that the innkeeper's failure to keep
the goods safe was itself fault. Therefore, the plea either denied a
loss occurred or pointed to an external cause.
Defendants were more likely to specify a cause for the loss and
contend they could not be held accountable for losses in that situation. Defendants claimed the goods were stolen by the plaintiffs
own servants 119 or by a third person in whose room the plaintiff

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 26 n.17 (1985); Stratton v. Swanlond,
Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, fol. 6, pl. 11 (1373), reprinted in K!RALFY, supra note 90, at 185;
Waldron v. Marshall, Y.B. 43 Edw. 3, fol. 33, pl. 38 (1370), reprinted in BAKER &
MILSOM, supra note 90, at 359; Robert de Stratton and Agnes his wife u. John
Swanlond surgeon, reprinted in PALMER, supra note 39, at 193 n.27, app. at 346.
116. Introduction to 1 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 92, at lxvi-lxviii;
see also 2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS FROM THE KING'S COURTS 1307-1399, at
437-46 (Morris S. Arnold ed., Selden Soc'y No. 103, 1987) [hereinafter 2 SELECT
CASES OF TRESPASS] (citing cases on actions against innkeepers).
117. William Latimer v. John Trentedens, CP 40/483, m. 590 (1381), reprinted in
2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 116, at 441, 441-42; Agnes Bolas v. John
Peacock, KB 27/454, m. 65, Coram Rege Roll (1374), reprinted in 2 SELECT CASES OF
TRESPASS, supra note 116, at 441, 441; see also Introduction to 1 SELECT CASES OF
TRESPASS, supra note 92, at lxvii n.508 (citing additional cases).
118. Introduction to 1 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 92, at lxvii. The
point of pleading was to refine the case to a single point of fact which could then be
put to the jury for a yes or no answer. A double plea, which could not be answered
simply because it posed additional alternatives, was generally unacceptable. The plea
that plaintiffs lost nothing by defendant's fault created issues as to whether loss and
fault existed, a result that should not have been permitted. Nevertheless, the plea
was apparently allowed. For example, Agnes Bolas u. John Peacock went to the jury
when both parties "put [themselves] on the country" on allegations that loss was not
through fault. Agnes Bolas u. John Peacock (1374), reprinted in 2 SELECT CASES OF
TRESPASS, supra note 116, at 441, 441.
119. Thomas Tetsworth v. Nicholas Bailey, CP 40/499, m. 345d (1385), reprinted
in 2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 116, at 444, 444-45; see also Horspole
v. Wayt, Coram Rege Roll, No. 588, m. 69d (1408), reprinted in 7 SELECT CASES IN
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insisted on staying contrary to the room assignment offered by the
defendant. 120 By the middle of the fifteenth century, the court allowed the defendant to assert that the plaintiff had intentionally
given the thief access to his belongings. In Horslow's Case, John
Prisot argued on behalf of the defendant that the plaintiffs goods
were taken by the friends who stayed with him in his room. The
court said that if the goods were taken by persons the plaintiff invited, the innkeeper was not liable. But if the goods were taken by
persons with whom the innkeeper had forced the lodger to stay, the
innkeeper would be liable. The parties joined issue over whether the
named persons were invited. 121
Innkeepers sometimes claimed that their guests had expressly
assumed the risk of loss. The first cases did not resolve the sufficiency of this defense. Some plaintiffs did not risk demurring to the
allegation, so the court did not decide the legal issue. 122 In other
cases, the issue for the jury was whether the defendant was at
faule 23 or whether the plaintiff was lodged with the defendant.124 The parties often went to the jury on whether the defendant was a "common" innkeeper, 125 i.e., whether the defendant
was in the business of providing lodging to the general public.126
The best justification for making guests responsible for their own
goods was that the host was not in the business of innkeeping.

THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH 1377-1422, at 179, 179-81 (G.O. Sayles ed., Selden
Soc'y No. 88, 1971) [hereinafter 7 KING'S BENCH] (holding innkeeper liable for guest's
stolen horses, despite innkeeper's assertion that guest's own servant led horse away).
120. Richard Waldegrave v. Thomas, KB 27/486, m. 26d (1382), reprinted in 2
SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 116, at 443, 443. "The inns of the fifteenth,
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries . . . had large chambers, up to 20 feet square,
capable of containing two, three or four beds, and accommodating up to half a dozen
bed-fellows . . . ." Pantin, supra note 23, at 184.
121. Horslow's Case, Y.B. 22 Hen. 6, fol. 21, pl. 38 (1444), translated in JOSEPH
H. BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CARRIERS AND OTHER BAILMENT AND QUASIBAILMENT SERVICES 4, 4-6 (1909). Prisot's first argument asked for judgment on the
ground that the claim was based on custom and not that it was heard by the common law, but Chief Justice Newton said custom is the law of the land. Id. at 5-6.
122. E.g., William Bolton v. Thomas Ede, CP 40/449, m. 350 (1373), reprinted in
2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 116, at 439, 439.
123. E.g., Nicholas Pound v. John Folksworth, KB 27/453, m. 90 (1374), reprinted
in 2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 116, at 440, 440-41.
124. E.g., Newland v. Ruddock, Coram Rege Roll, No. 471, m. 54 (1378), reprinted in 7 KING'S BENCH, supra note 119, at 11, 11-12.
125. E.g., Barnolby v. Willyn, Coram Rege Roll, No. 564 (1402), reprinted in 7
KING'S BENCH, supra note 119, at 121, 121-22; William Thomas v. John Sampson,
CP 40/495, m. 502 (1384), reprinted in 2 SELECT CASES OF TRESPASS, supra note 116,
at 443, 443-44.
126. "He is in a common employment who is in it as a business; the word defines his profession, his undertaking." Adler, supra note 4, at 152.
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The distinction between persons who performed an act sporadically and those who performed it as a regular business applied to
numerous businesses besides innkeeping. It was an innkeeper's
business to prevent misfortune from befalling a lodger's goods, just
as it was the doctor's business to perform surgery skillfully. Individuals could not expect the same skill and care to be demonstrated by
someone who acted only sporadically. Thus, in the new action on
the case for injury done by someone hired to work on the person or
property of another, plaintiffs had either to allege that the defendant specifically undertook to perform the task skillfully or that the
defendant was in the business-a "common" veterinarian127 or a
"common" innkeeper.128
The courts ultimately accepted the principle that hosts' liability
depended on whether they were in the regular business of providing
lodging. For example, in 1410 a plaintiff brought trespass on the
case alleging that his horse had been stolen while he was lodging at
the defendant's inn. The defendant responded that he was not a
common innkeeper and, therefore, could not be responsible for the
goods. The suit was abated when the justices said the failure to
allege that the defendant was a common innkeeper was fatal to the
suit. 129 The courts debated the proper pleading procedure long after the substantive principle was settled. Thus, in Horslow's Case,
Chief Justice Newton said that the plaintiff did not have to allege
that the defendant was a common innkeeper, but the defendant
should have pleaded as an affirmative defense that he did not operate a common inn. 130 Questions about the proper pleading of
common innkeeper status plagued litigation for centuries, but each
case reinforced the special obligations of the common innkeeper as
distinguished from the individual who sporadically boarded travelers.Iai
The distinction between standards of liability for common innkeepers and incidental hosts appealed to common sense. It also

127. E.g., Marshal's Case, Y.B. 19 Hen. 6, fol. 49, pl. 5 (1441), reprinted in
FIFOOT, supra note 90, at 345, 345-47.
128. E.g., Cooper v. Lorchon, Coram Rege Roll, No. 602, m. 6d (1411), reprinted
in 7 KING'S BENCH, supra note 119, at 203, 203-05; see also supra note 121 and
accompanying text (discussing Horslow's Case).
129. The Innkeepers Case, Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 45, pl. 18 (1410), reprinted in
BEALE, supra note 121, at 3, 3-4.
130. BEALE, supra note 121, at 4-6.
131. By the sixteenth century, the plaintiff clearly was required to allege that
the defendant kept a common inn, but the reference to the custom of the realm in
the usual writ sufficed. E.g., Mason v. Grafton, 80 Eng. Rep. 391, 391 (1618); Calye's
Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 520, 521 (1584); Sanders v. Spencer, 73 Eng. Rep. 591, 591
(1568).
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made economic sense. Businesses could pay for their liability from
the fees they received, spreading the risk as part of the cost of doing
business. Those whose sporadic service prevented them from avoiding the impact of liability were excused. In the innkeeper's case,
factors which pointed to the imposition of liability on the businessman pointed away from strict liability in the casual lodging arrangement: the casual lodger did not come to the neighborhood to
stay with the particular lessor; the casual lessor may not have had
significant assets; the sporadic nature of the arrangements prevented the casual lessor from passing on liability costs to customers; and
the casual lessor would probably not improve security arrangements
just to reduce liability for an occasional guest. Strict liability for
persons not in the business of renting rooms to travelers would
make occasional boarding so risky that lodgings might be denied.
This would be to everyone's disadvantage.

III. THE TALE OF THE OVERCROWDED INN: White's Case AND THE
INNKEEPER'S DUTY TO SERVE THE PUBLIC (1558)

The common innkeeper's liability for customer losses developed
quite differently in England than it did in Rome. The common innkeeper in Rome was free to reject lodgers. In England, however, he
had a duty to serve the public. Roman law demonstrates that a
common innkeeper does not necessarily undertake an obligation to
serve the public. English law, not the innkeeper's express commitment, imposed the duty to serve the public as a standard of performance that the common innkeeper must meet. 132
The English innkeeper's obligation to serve the public was a
product of numerous factors. The profit motive combined with
crime-control mechanisms to create a context in which the duty to
serve appeared to be a familiar principle. It became familiar in
abstract discussions of law in arguments, lectures, and dicta that
never focused on its utility. Finally, it became accepted as a means
of making effective the earlier principle of innkeeper liability for the
losses of their guests.

132. Thus, Professor Burdick's suggestion that "common" as a description of an
innkeeper implied an undertaking to serve all who should apply and to serve them
with care does not explain the origin of the duty. Burdick, supra note 7, at 516--17;
cf. Arterburn, supra note 77, at 418-20 (arguing "common" usually distinguished
those engaged in trade from those who performed occasional acts).
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A. Business Practices and the Assignment of Strangers in Town
The customary practices of innkeepers influenced the development of the duty to serve the public. To some extent the inns were
heirs to a medieval tradition of hospitality, 133 but the innkeepers'
hospitality was not free. The tradition of hospitality was in tension
with the suspicion of strangers that is reflected in the laws requiring hosts to answer for their guests. But the prospect of payment induced innkeepers to take anyone other than a known criminal. In
addition to losing income when they turned persons away, if their
rejection became known, the innkeepers also risked discouraging
others from planning to stay at the inn. Innkeepers were more likely to stuff as many lodgers as possible into a room than to turn any
lodgers away. Medieval travelers expected innkeepers to accept all
members of the public because innkeepers normally did.
Another factor that supported the expectation of service in inns
was the assignment of foreigners to inns. Innkeepers might want to
reject people from other countries, but the crown had a particular
interest in preventing that. Aliens were under the king's protection,
and the crown might occasionally intervene to assure their comfort
and their return. 134 But the crown was less concerned with protecting foreigners than with realizing its full potential revenues
from them and keeping them under watchful eye, as demonstrated
by the twelfth- and thirteenth-century laws making hosts responsible for foreigners. 135 In the fifteenth century, parliament required
city officials to assign foreign merchants a host and to report the
assignment to them. 136 This was obviously a measure to control

133. "Throughout the Middle Ages the principle of free hospitality for travellers
was accepted as a corner-stone of Christian charity." CLARK, supra note 23, at 25-26;
Noel Coulet, Inns and Taverns, 6 DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 468 (Joseph R.
Strayer ed., 1985).
134. A seventeenth-century judge said that aliens had been abused in earlier
times and the justices in eyre assigned them inns. Resolutions Concerning Innes, 123
Eng. Rep. 1128, 1128 (1635). The justice was not speaking from memory-action by
justices on eyre would indicate that the royal officers were protecting aliens by assigning hosts in the thirteenth century. To the author's knowledge, there is no published record of such cases, but such assignments may have occurred as incident to
the assizes which required hosts to be responsible for their guests. See supra note 68
and accompanying text (discussing Statute of Winchester's imposition of individual
liability on people outside city limits for boarder's crimes). The judge may also have
attributed the fifteenth-century assignment by city officials to the justices on eyre.
See infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing assignment of lodging to
aliens).
135. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing laws making hosts
liable for their guests).
136. CALENDAR OF PLEA AND MEMORANDA ROLLS OF THE CITY OF LONDON, A.D.
1437-1457, at 34-35 (Philip E. Jones ed., 1954).
HeinOnline -- 1996 Utah L. Rev. 76 1996

No.1]

THE INNKEEPER'S TALE

77

aliens and strangers rather than to facilitate their lodging. An alien
or stranger who failed to have a host assigned would be punished.137 In this context, any assignment of lodgings to aliens,
whether by the justices in eyre or the city mayor, did not establish a
general duty to serve all comers.
The customary practice of receiving all comers and the assignment of strangers to inns combined to support the principle that the
expectation of service was enforceable. Yet these factors fell short of
establishing such a principle. Almost a century passed before the
principle was finally accepted.
B. The Roman Agency Case-Division over

the Innkeeper's Duty (1460)
In 1460, Judge Walter Moyle of the Court of Common Pleas
said, "mf I come to an innkeeper to lodge with him and he refuses
to provide lodging for me, I shall have upon my case an action of
trespass against him."138 Chief Justice John Prisot quickly responded that "the innkeeper is not bound ... to provide lodging for
you if he does not want to."139
The litigation which provoked the disagreement between Prisot
and Moyle did not even involve an innkeeper. It was an action in
debt brought by a plaintiff who claimed he had been hired to go to
Rome to obtain a papal bull.140 The issue in this case was whether
the defendant could ''wage his law"141 after making a general denial. The court agreed that wager of law was appropriate for the case
at bar. Prisot noted that wager did not lie for employment governed
by statute (presumably the Statute of Laborers142) but that employers could wage their law in debt actions where an agreement
provided the basis of liability, giving as one example the hiring of
priests.
Although all the judges concurred that wager of law applied to

137. Id. at 45.
138. Anonymous, Y.B. 39 Hen. 6, fol. 18, pl. 24 (1460), reprinted in BAKER &
MILSOM, supra note 90, at 217, 217.
139. Id.
140. The content of the bull was not specified, but the Church was a central
political and economic institution in the fifteenth century. The pope's declarations
could control economic assets as well as affect religious developments.
141. Wager of law involved the assertion or denial on oath of a formal claim by
a party supported by a number of other persons who swore to belief in the truth of
the assertor's oath. POTrER, supra note 97, at 318-19.
142. The Statute of Laborers was passed after the Black Death in an effort to
secure adequate labor at the rate prevailing before the catastrophe. PuTNAM, supra
note 75, at 2-3.
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the case before them, Justice Moyle challenged Prisot's theory that
wager of law in a debt action was available only when the services
were furnished by agreement and not when services were compelled
by law. Moyle said innkeepers and victuallers were bound to serve
by the common law, but if they sued their customer in debt, the
customer could wage his law. Prisot agreed that the customers of
innkeepers and victuallers could wage their law if sued in debt, but
he contended the relationship was founded in consent and not compulsion.143 Thus Prisot's denial of innkeepers' obligation to serve
the public was part of his attempt to limit the scope of the increasingly unpopular wager oflaw. 144

C. The Development of the Principle
For nearly a century after the even division of the judges in the
Roman agency case, attorneys and judges continued to discuss the
innkeeper's obligation to provide shelter without satisfactory resolution. The division of the judges was resolved by finding there was
such an obligation, but the obligation was enforceable only locally.
Within thirty years, the innkeeping profession grew to believe the
obligation could be enforced in common-law courts, and the courts
in turn agreed. But as the principle became increasingly familiar
and accepted in discussion, the earlier views-that there was no
obligation or that an obligation was not enforceable in the royal
courts-continued to be voiced, and innkeepers' obligation to provide
shelter was never the direct subject oflitigation. 145
1. Judicial Dicta-Only Local Officials Enforce (1465)

Five years after the Roman agency case, the justices said that
if a common innkeeper refused to provide shelter, the rejected guest
had no action against the innkeeper in the king's court, but the
guest could complain to local authorities who had control over the

143. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 90, at 217-18.
144. Prisot's position in support of innkeeper choice was also consistent with his
representation of the defendant more than 15 years earlier in Horslow's Case. See
supra note 121 (discussing Prisot's argument in Horslow that innkeeper should not
be liable for lodger's room guests).
145. An exigent was ordered on a 1367 writ for forcibly ejecting a woman from
an inn at night so that she was stranded in the dark. Robert de Garton v. Adam
Dodmore, in PALMER, supra note 39, at 165 n.48, app. at 378. The writ, however,
was premised on initial permission to lodge at the inn. The writ did not raise the
issue of whether the innkeeper could have denied the woman permission before a
relationship was formed. Although further research in the writs might find a direct
action for an innkeeper's refusal to allow a customer to lodge in an inn, Garton
provides the best example of a direct action of which the author is aware.
HeinOnline -- 1996 Utah L. Rev. 78 1996

No.1]

THE INNKEEPER'S TALE

79

inn. 146 This statement was made in response to counsel's argument on the right of hostlers, tailors, or horse sellers to hold the
property of a party until the party tendered payment.147
The reported view of the justices seems to compromise the prior
disagreement over the innkeepers' duty. Prisot's contention, that
innkeepers were not subject to royal writ for improperly refusing a
guest, prevailed. This diverted a low monetary issue from the king's
court. On the other hand, Moyle's assertion that common innkeepers had a duty to serve the public gained recognition although the
duty was enforced by local authorities. 148 The reference to the local authority suggests that the judges were thinking of enforcement
measures similar to the assignment of strangers to hosts in London
rather than to private suits for damages. Yet there is no clear
statement of the mechanism for local enforcement, and Moyle could
accept the decision as reflecting recognition of a local form of
trespass on the case.

2. The Private Right of Action (1499)
· The statement of principle in 1465 left some ambiguity about
enforcement. Specifically, it did not explain how the local authorities were to respond to complaints. This ambigwty left the door
open to the argument that innkeepers' obligation to serve the public
was enforceable by the injured party in a civil action for trespass on
the case. In turn, recognition of a civil action at the local level
translated into a common-law right as the business of the commonlaw courts expanded.

(a) Green's Reading and Rex v. Chester-Recognition by the
Bar (1499)
In 1499, John Grene (Green) gave a reading in the inns of court
the Statute of Marlborough149 in which he dealt with the propriety of distraint for chattels150 of a traveler lodging somewhere

on

146. Anonymous, Y.B. 5 Ed. 4, fol. 2, pl. 21 (1465).
147. The innkeeper's lien and its relationship to the innkeeper's duties was a
continual topic for discussion in Common Pleas. See Y.B. 22 Edw. 4, fol. 49, pl. 15
(1483).
148. Prisot was no longer on the bench of Common Pleas, but Needham, who
had joined Prisot in the Roman agency case, still sat on Common Pleas. Danby, who
had joined Moyle, was now the Chief Justice, and Moyle was still on the bench. 4
EDWARD FOSS, THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 391 (AMS Press, Inc. 1966) (1851).
149. 1267, 52 Hen. 3, reprinted in STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 57, at 55,
55-74.
150. Distraint of chattels is seizure of chattels by distress which is "a taking,
without legal process, of a personal chattel from the possession of a wrongdoer into
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other than a common inn. Green said distraint was appropriate because immunity from distraint was proper only for staying at a
common inn. Others argued the immunity from distraint was for
the benefit of the traveler, not the innkeeper, and should apply
wherever the traveler was forced to stay. But all acknowledged a
key difference between the keeper of a common inn and other lodgings. "For instance, if he will not receive a stranger, and he has no
cause against him (for instance, that he is a felon . . . or the king's
enemy, or such like), the party may have an action on his case
against him if he is thereby damaged."151 Green's reading shows
that the members of the profession accepted Moyle's position, but no
one cited any holding to that effect.
In the same year as Green's reading, Sergeant Higham stated
in his argument before the Court of Common Pleas in Rex v. Bishop
of Chester: 152
If I go to an innkeeper and ask to be lodged with him, and he says
that he will not do it now, but if I come another time he will do so
willingly; I will have an action on the case because it was his duty
to shelter me, and by the law he was bound to do this. 153

Although local courts might accept process that could be described as an action on the case, the argument was used in a common law court where its weight was dependent on its being acknowledged as common law and not just as a possible local variant.
Thus, Higham assumed that the common-law court would find that
action on the case lies for refusal to shelter a traveler.
(b) Judicial Dicta (1503)

In 1503, the discussion in the inns and argument presented by
the attorneys took effect. The court specifically recognized the
traveler's cause of action against the innkeeper for shelter: "[W]here
a smith declines to shoe my horse, or an innkeeper refuses to give
me entertainment at his inn, I shall have an action on the case,
notwithstanding no act is done; for it does not sound in covenant."154 The court continued, saying suit would not lie in trespass

the hands of a party grieved, as a pledge for the redressing of an injury, the performance of a duty or the satisfaction of a demand." JOWITr'S DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH
LAw 64 (2nd ed. 1977).
151. Grene, Reader, On the First Chapter of the Statute of Marlborough, in THE
NOTEBOOK OF Sm JOHN PORT 163, 167-68 (J.H. Baker ed., Selden Soc'y No. 102,
1986).
152. Roy v. Evesq. of Chester, Y.B. 14 Hen. 7, fol. 22, pl. 4 (1499).
153. Id. at 22 (translation by author).
154. Anonymous, Keilway, fol. 50, pl. 4, 72 Eng. Rep. 208 (1503), reprinted in
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against a carpenter for failing to build a house, but would only lie in
covenant unless the suit was for doing a badjob. 155
In context, the judges appear to be discussing common-law
actions that could be appropriately filed in the Court of Common
Pleas. Although the judges apparently agreed there was a commonlaw action for trespass on the case for an innkeeper's failure to
serve the public, the author of the report left the matter in disarray.
The report noted that a man had no suit against an innkeeper
in the king's courts but only in local jurisdictions, citing the 1465
decision. Despite the conflicting statement of the 1503 court quoted
above and the 1499 statement of Sergeant Higham in the Bishop of
Chester argument cited in the reporter's note, the note clung to the
1465 decision. 156

(c) Hale's Reading-Continued Denial of Cause of Action (1530)
Despite the statements of court and counsel at the onset of the
sixteenth century upholding the innkeepers' obligation, the issue remained open. Indeed, the note in the 1503 report appears to have
been more influential with the bar than were the statements of the
bench. In 1537, James Hale gave a reading on costs at Gray's Inn in
which he discussed situations when an action on the case lay for
nonfeasance. He stated that an individual could bring an action on
the case against a blacksmith who maliciously refused to shoe a
horse where no other smith was available. He continued: "It is otherwise if I go to someone who has a common inn, and request him
to lodge me, and tender him money to do so, and he refuses, I shall
nevertheless not have an action."157

BRUCE WYMAN, CASES ON PuBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES: PUBLIC CARRIERS, PuBLIC, AND
OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES 1, 1 (2d ed. 1909).

155. Yearbook cases are frustrating to modern lawyers when, as here, they do
not even suggest who the parties were or what they were litigating. This case set
forth the principle that an action on the case lies against an innkeeper who refuses
to provide entertainment. It linked smiths and innkeepers together and distinguished
carpenters from them without explanation. The discussion apparently was reported to
illustrate the distinction between trespass on the case and covenant, but the
reporter's note is insufficient for that purpose. Adler suggests the carpenter in building a house had only one employer and, thus, should have been able to refuse employment, unlike the smith or innkeeper who would have had many customers simultaneously. Adler, supra note 4, at 146-58.
156. Anonymous, Keilway, fol. 50, pl. 4, 72 Eng. Rep. 208 (1503), reprinted in
WYMAN, supra note 154, at 1; see E.W. Ives, The Origins of the Later Year Books, in
LEGAL HisTORY STUDIES, supra note 112, at 136, 145-46 (discussing origins and
eclectic nature of Keilway's reports).
157. James Hales' Reading on Costs (1537), in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 90,
at 345, 347.
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3. Absence of Litigation
The obligation of innkeepers to serve the public remained in
disarray because no litigation directly involved the issue. Judicial
statements were dicta, and the views of counsel, the bar, and even
the Yearbook authors remained uncertain. The explanation for this
state of affairs is simple. Litigation in the Middle Ages against an
innkeeper who refused to serve all comers faced major obstacles.
The traveler between cities needed food and lodging for the
night-if these were refused, there would be little chance of getting
the royal courts to intervene before the night was through. Thus,
unless someone intervened locally, the traveler would simply have
to seek lodging elsewhere (e.g., a monastery or someone's home). 158
Damages for the innkeeper's refusal to serve a traveler were less
than the cost of obtaining a writ in the king's court and well below
the forty shilling minimum for crown jurisdiction. 159 Thus, if redress were sought, it would have been in local courts. 160 The potential plaintiffs travels would militate against pursuing remedies
in any local forum. 161
For many centuries after innkeeper's liability for guests' losses
was established, these practical barriers deterred litigation in royal
courts that would have compelled innkeepers to pay damages for
refusing to lodge a traveler. There may have been a general expectation that innkeepers could refuse lodging on specific grounds (e.g.,
that the customer was a criminal or a member of the lower classes).162 Whether the power to reject a potential lodger on specified

158. An issue in several cases was whether the plaintiff was lodged with a "common" innkeeper or someone who was not in that business. This suggests that travelers often made do with what accommodations they could find when the inn was full
or they needed to stop short of the next inn.
159. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining minimum damage requirements for trespass writ and for royal jurisdiction).
160. For damages to be sufficiently high to make it economically sensible to obtain a writ in the king's court, the plaintiff would have to claim that his property or
his person was injured by failure to obtain lodging. It would be difficult to show that
the rejection caused the injury. The greatest likelihood of serious injury would come
from assault or robbery by third parties. While innkeepers were liable for third-party
injuries done to their guests, it would have been a further stretch to find them liable
for third-party injuries done to persons they refused to serve. The liability of the
physician, carpenter, veterinarian, or smith for injuries flowing from refusal to perform was still in question, and in most of those cases at least the injury flowed
naturally from the environment and would not have been a product of an intervening
person's action.
161. Records at the local level are not readily available, so it is difficult to determine whether any intervention occurred.
162. CLARK, supra note 23, at 7-8, 86, '129.
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grounds was a defense to an action for failure to serve could not be
determined until suit was brought, and no such litigation is
known.163
Nevertheless, judges considered the question of the innkeeper's
duty to serve the public in connection with cases involving the scope
of wager at law in employment, the right of a hostler to retain a
horse until paid for its care, and breach of contract actions against a
carpenter. Lawyers borrowed reasoning from innkeeper liability
when discussing issues of advowson164 and the right of distraint.
In the end, the principle that travelers had a right to maintain suit
for denial of lodgings became familiar through its use in cases involving other issues. The principle did not, however, become fully
accepted until the court used it as a basis for its decision, and the
principle's scope seems never to have been worked out in detail.

D. Business Regulation in the Late Medieval Era
The innkeeper's obligation to serve the public was compatible
with existing related law. For example, the assizes of bread and ale
set prices for these basic commodities. Indeed, price regulation existed in a variety of trades in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.165 In some cases, price regulation may have compelled service. If a seller attempted to obtain a higher price, the customer
would probably pay the higher price and then have the seller indicted.166 In practice, this prevented the seller from obtaining more
than the price fixed by the assize. Since the attempt to get more
money was likely to be the primary reason for a seller's reluctance
to part with his stock in trade, the local authorities effectively compelled service in the guise of price regulation of basic commodities.
Direct compulsion to serve also had analogues in the statutes
regulating labor. The Statute of Laborers imposed an obligation of
service on individuals throughout the latter half of the fourteenth
century. 167 Similar principles were at work in the Statutes of Arti-

163. No one to the author's knowledge has found any local cases from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century that address recovery of damages from an innkeeper
who refused to lodge a stranger.
164. Advowson is "[a] right of presentation to a church or benefice." BOUVIER,
supra note 36, at 157. The "right of presentation" refers to the right to name the
priest, who in turn receives the revenues of the position. The right of presentation
was at issue in the Bishop of Chester case in 1499. See supra notes 152-53 and
accompanying text.
165. E. LIPSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC HisTORY OF ENGLAND: THE
MIDDLE AGES 300-02 (4th ed. 1926).
166. Arterburn, supra note 77, at 424.
167. See PUTNAM, supra note 75, at 1-5.
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ficers in the sixteenth century. 168
E. Comparative Law Note-France (1563)
The link between enforcement of regulated prices and the obligation to serve the public was explicit in France. In 1563, Charles
IX proclaimed an ordinance to set prices for meals at inns and taverns.169 Responsibility for the law was ascribed to Chancellor
!'Hospital who was familiar with the innkeepers' gouging of customers.170 Article 19 of this ordinance forbade innkeepers from refusing without cause to receive travelers. According to a French court
in the nineteenth century, Article 19, "far from being a measure of
the general police power, was only a way to assure the enforcement
of the fee schedule."171
The French experience raises the possibility that the English
duty to serve the public was also a lever to secure ends beyond
access to lodgings. In contrast to France, the obligation to serve the
public in England was not part of the statutes regulating prices.
Lodging was relatively inexpensive and does not seem to have been
directly regulated. Innkeepers did not condition lodging on payment
of an unlawful price. There was, however, one condition that innkeepers might have been anxious to see their guests accept. Innkeepers were likely to insist that their guests waive the right to sue
them for property loss or damages. Thus the duty to serve the public in England forestalled attempts to dilute the strict liability of
innkeepers for their customers' goods.
F. White's Case (1558): Liability for Guest's Losses Where Rightful
Rejection Is Supplanted by Waiver and Lodging
While the innkeeper's obligation to serve the public had become
a familiar principle that was compatible with English law, there
were no occasions to apply it. It was not until the obligation to serve
became a part of the law on liability for losses of customer goods
that the principle took on a practical utility. The obligation to serve
then prevented innkeepers from avoiding strict liability for losses of
guests.
Throughout the century after Navenby, innkeepers continually

168. See JOYCE YOUINGS, SIXTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 291-99 (1984) (discussing
Statute of Artificers' attempt to create universal obligation to work).
169. DALLOZ, RECUEIL PERIODIQUE DE JURISPRUDENCE 1863, at 485 n.3 (1863).
170. Id.
171. Cour de Cassation, 18 Juillet 1862, in DALLOZ, supra note 169, at 485-86
(translation by author). In the case, the court held that the termination of price
regulation resulted in the abrogation of the obligation to serve.
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argued that they were not liable for losses suffered by a guest who
had agreed to assume the risk of inadequate lodgings. In 1558, the
court made the duty to serve the public a pivotal element of this
defense. In White's Case, an innkeeper claimed he had refused the
plaintiff lodging because the inn was full of guests, but the plaintiff
said ''he will make shift among the other guests."172 The Court of
Common Pleas agreed that the loss fell on the plaintiff, who insisted on the overcrowded quarters after being refused, but stated
that "if the cause of the refusal be false, the guest may have his action on the case for his refusal."173
White's Case held that the innkeeper has a common-law duty to
harbor travelers if he has room. 174 It is less clear whether the
court's statement referred to an action on the case for denying lodging or to an action on the case for loss of goods in a common inn.
The first reading assumes that ''his action on the case for his refusal" describes the gravamen of the action on the case. It focuses on
the loss as the result of the innkeeper's refusal to lodge the traveler
in a secure, available room without other lodgers. The action would
be for the improper refusal to harbor the guest, and the loss of
goods would simply be a measure of the damages suffered.
Alternatively, ''his action on the case" may refer to the action
then before the court, which was premised on liability for a guest's
loss rather than on denial of service. The sentence preceding ''his
action on the case" stated that the innkeeper's refusal was a valid
defense to the action for lost goods. 175 Thus, it follows that if the
grounds for the refusal were false, the defense should fail. In the
action on the case for lost goods, the issue would be whether the
refusal was false. Under that interpretation, the phrase "for his
refusal" applies to the issue in dispute rather than to the cause of
action, i.e., he will have his action for lost goods tried on the issue
of the propriety of the rejection.
Under either reading, there is a link between the innkeeper's
liability for losses and his duty to serve the public. If the innkeeper
had a satisfactory basis for rejecting the lodger, the innkeeper could
shift the risk of loss to the lodger. Without a sufficient reason, however, the innkeeper bore the risk. White's Case shows that innkeeper liability for guests' losses was a factor in the development of the
duty to serve the public.
The duty to serve the public enhanced the likelihood that the

172.
173.
174.
175.

White's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 343, 343 (1558).
ld. at 344.
ld. at 343-44.
ld. at 344.
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traveler would obtain security in lodgings, but under White's Case,
it also increased the effectiveness of the strict liability rule. It permitted waiver of liability where the innkeeper, acting in a proper
professional fashion, could not provide safe accommodations, but it
prevented innkeepers from avoiding their liability by conditioning
admission to the inn on a waiver of rights to recover.
Prior to the creation of the obligation to serve the public, it was
possible to conceive of the innkeeper's relationship to the customer
as primarily contractual, anachronistic though that term may be in
an era when assumpsit was still developing and a general doctrine
of contract had not yet emerged. After the duty to serve the public
became established, however, the status-based nature of the relationship was clearly recognized. Common innkeepers could not disclaim liability because liability was a function of status and not of
contract. For example, the Court of Common Pleas in 1586
nonsuited a plaintiff for lack of jurisdiction because the suit was not
brought in the county of the inn. 176 The court noted that an action
on the case for words or on a contract might be brought elsewhere,
but that suit for safekeeping guests' goods must be brought in the
county of the inn. 177 The crux of the case was not what the parties
said to each other about staying there, but what was inherent in
the nature of common innkeepers. Thus liability was based on status rather than agreement. 178

G. The Principle Accepted
The liability established in the sixteenth century for refusals to
serve the public was imposed by an action on the case-a private
cause of action brought for damages by the person excluded. The
following century saw the suggestion that the innkeeper's obligation
was enforceable through criminal measures as well.

1. The Constable's Role (1622)
In his 1622 manual for justices of the peace, Michael Dalton
said the duty to serve the public was enforceable through the constable.
If a common !nne-holder or Alehouse-keeper will not lodge a travel-

176. Anonymous, 78 Eng. Rep. 26, 26 (1586).
177. Id.
178. One legal scholar tied recovery in quantum meruit to the duty to serve the
public-since the innkeeper is required by law to serve individuals, it is only fair
that he receive reasonable compensation. POTIER, supra note 97, at 467; see
Warbrook v. Griffin, 123 Eng. Rep. 927, 927 (1609).
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ler, any Constable, or Justice of peace, may compel him thereto; but
how the officer shall compel him, quare: it seemeth that all the
officer can do, is either to cause such Alehouse-keeper to be suppressed; or else to present or prefer such offence at the sessions of
the peace, that so such offender may be thereupon indicted. 179

Although the king's courts said that the rejected lodger had an
action on the case, it was not a practical remedy. The rejected traveler needed an immediate order from the local authorities addressed
to the innkeeper and backed by the threat of criminal sanctions.
Local constables would be more effective than a slow judicial process-with low damages-in obtaining shelter for a stranger who
was passing through.
The quare in Dalton's discussion indicates that the constable's
role in enforcing the duty to serve was not well established in the
seventeenth century. Constables had control over taverns because of
concern with the sale of alcohol, but there was no suggestion that
the power over the sale of alcohol had previously been used as
mechanism to impose unrelated obligations on the tavernkeeper.
Earlier guides to justices of the peace, such as the sixteenth-century
Boke of Justices, contain no suggestion of any such duty. 180 Thus
Dalton's statement about the constable's power to compel innkeepers to serve the public was theoretical rather than descriptive of
established practice. Constables probably did not begin to assert the
power to compel lodging until after the courts had said that a person refused lodgings could have an action on the case.

a

2. The Resolution of the Judges (1624)
Dalton's observations appeared around the time the justices
engaged in one of their most in-depth considerations of the obligations of innkeepers. In 1623, four persons were indicted for common
nuisance for erecting four inns. The judges said that establishing an
inn was not a common nuisance unless there were particular circumstances that made it so-such as its use to shelter thieves, its
inappropriate location, or its addition to an area where too many
inns existed already. Since no special circumstances appeared in the
four cases, the indictment should have been quashed. 181
179. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 26 (photo. reprint 1972) (1622).
180. See THE BOKE OF JUSTICES OF PEAS passim (photo. reprint 1976) (1506);
BERTHA H. PUTNAM, EARLY TREATISES ON THE PRACTICE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE IN THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES passim (1924). The author has
found no indictment of any innkeeper for failing to serve a traveler in his review of
English documents generally available in American libraries.
181. The indictment was also quashed on the ground that it constituted several
indictments rather than one and should be brought separately. Anonymous, 81 Eng.
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The justices mentioned the obligation to serve the public when
they discussed whether innkeeping was a common nuisance. They
noted that the status of common innkeeper existed without any
governmental approval. 182 Justice Chamberlaine noted that simply
by putting up a sign and lodging travelers, an individual became
liable to an action on the case for refusing someone shelter. 183
That person could avoid liability by removing the sign and getting
out of the business, but Chief Justice Lea pointed out that an innkeeper who once held herself out as a common innkeeper could not
avoid liability by removing the sign if she continued to take
guests. 184 Similarly, the reporter mentions Justice Dodridge's observation that the writ for the action on the case against innkeepers
did not specify a source of authority for the defendant's common
innkeeper status. 185 Since one could be a common innkeeper for
the purposes of the common law without approval, the justices concluded that no special permission was necessary and that the erection of an inn was not a common nuisance. 186
Prodded by the indictments, the judges conferred among themselves and announced that licenses were not required to erect an
inn. 187 Chief Baron Tanfield thought that inns had been licensed
by the justices of the eyre in the past, but the other judges disagreed.188 "[N]othing could be shewn to that purpose."189
Chief Justice Lea denied that the justices in eyre licensed inns,
but he did say ''because that strangers which were aliens were
abused and evilly intreated in the inns, it was (upon complaint
thereof) provided that they should be well lodged, and inns were
assigned to them by the justices in eire." 190 The experience of London suggested that the assignment of aliens to inns was more likely
to protect the citizens from the aliens than vice-versa. Inns could be
suppressed as a common nuisance if they were built in a remote
and inconvenient place where they were dangerous to travelers and

Rep. 842, 842 (1623).
182. Id. at 842-43.
183. Id. at 843.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Resolutions Concerning Innes, supra note 6, at 1129.
188. Id.
189. Id. Whether the justices on eyre licensed inns, there is evidence of specific
local laws requiring licensing or its equivalent. See MUNIMENTA, supra note 52, at
281-83, 721 (discussing ordinance requiring innkeepers to be good and sufficient
people and ordinance providing that foreigners must have grant of franchise from
city to operate inn).
190. Resolutions Concerning Innes, supra note 6, at 1129.
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harbored men of bad fame who were likely to commit robbery. Also,
a man of bad behavior could be stopped from running the inn. But
these were factual issues traversable in the suit. It was clear to the
justices that erection of an inn by itself was not improper and no
license was necessary to operate it.
Finally, in their conference the judges considered ''by what way
or means the multitude of inns might be prevented."191 The judges
responded, as Dalton had suggested, that control over inns could be
accomplished by regulating drinking. Inns could be suppressed if
they were nuisances, and restrictions on granting liquor licenses
would prevent the proliferation of inns.
This review of the status of inns reveals innkeeping was not an
exclusive business, and indeed, there were often concerns that too
many inns existed and there was too much competition. 192 Nevertheless, all the judges concurred that innkeepers were bound to
accept members of the public so long as the innkeepers had room.

3. The Status of Innkeepers-Newton v. Trigg (1691)
By the end of the seventeenth century, the obligation of the
innkeeper to serve the public was firmly established. The special
characteristics of the innkeeper were analyzed in Newton v.

191. ld.
192. Professor Bruce Wyman argued that the common-law obligation imposed on
those engaged in a common calling to accommodate all who applied was based on a
virtual monopoly. Wyman claimed that the inns in medieval England had such power. But Wyman's theory may have determined his "facts." Wyman, supra note 3, at
157-61.
The court did not offer monopoly power as an explanation for the innkeeper's
duty to serve the public. Monopoly did not lead to such a duty in other businesses,
and innkeeping was not a monopoly. No case cited by Wyman mentions monopoly
power as a basis for its decision. When commerce was just beginning and towns
were quite small by modern standards, many occupations had only one or a small
number of practitioners. Carpenters, smiths, tailors, and other specialized crafts existed in numbers proportionate to the demand in the area. H.S. BENNE'IT, LIFE ON THE
ENGLISH MANOR: A STUDY OF PEAsANT CONDITIONS 1150-1400, at 66-67 (1956). That
did not inevitably lead to a duty to serve the public. Further, inns did not have
complete monopoly power. Resolutions Concerning Innes, supra note 6, at 1128-29.
Where inns were not available or were overcrowded, travellers could often find shelter with private individuals or with the church. JUSSERAND, supra note 31, at
122-25. The prices charged for food were regulated by statute at one time in the
fourteenth century, but there was no attempt to legislate room charges. Statutes 23
Ed. ill, ch. 6; 27 Ed. ill, st. I, ch. 3; see JUSSERAND, supra note 31, at 128-29 (noting lodging was inexpensive and food very simple for ordinary travelers). This suggests the provision of shelter was not so restricted as to call for government intervention. The difficulties of a traveller faced with rejection from an inn may have
been an element in establishing a duty to serve all who request service, but it is unlikely to be the sole explanation for the result.
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Trigg/ 93 where the court decided that an innkeeper was not a
trader within the Statute of Bankrupts and therefore could not
declare bankruptcy. Bankruptcy, the court said, is available only for
those who act pursuant to agreements. The innkeeper is governed
by rules derived from his status: he must lodge strangers; he is
liable for losses they suffer; and he is paid a reasonable sum of
money for his services. Citing the Resolutions Concerning Innes on
the erection of inns, Justice Eyre said:
Inns are of necessity; the keeper is chargeable to the public, and
compellable to lodge all comers, he cannot refuse whom he pleases . . . . Inn-keepers are compellable by the constable to lodge
strangers; they may detain the persons of the guests who eat, or
the horse which eats, till payment.... They do not deal upon contracts as others do; they only make bills, in which they cannot set
unreasonable rates; if they do, they are indictable for extortion .... 194

For the proposition that inns "are of necessity," Justice Eyre
cited the report of the 1623 indictments that declared inns run by
four defendants to be a common nuisance. The judges said the indictment failed to allege any specific grounds to show the inns were
a nuisance, such as there were now too many inns in the town. 195
It appears, however, that the court said that "this inn is of necessity."196 That statement was not a generalization on the necessity of
inns, but a specific response to whether there were "too many" in
this town. Far from considering inns a necessity, the judges were
debating whether their erection was a common nuisance. They subsequently discussed how to control the proliferation of inns. In that
context, the case is a slim reed for finding that "[i]nns are of necessity." Justice Eyre seems to use it to explain why innkeepers have
an obligation not common to other trades. The obligation to serve
the public was now well accepted, even if there was little occasion to
enforce it. The rationale for that obligation, however, had never
been expressed. If inns were a necessity, the need to provide service
would follow. But it is more likely that Eyre reasoned from the existence of the obligation to the necessity of the inn.
Justice Eyre also referred to the innkeeper as "compellable by
the constable to lodge strangers."197 He did not indicate when the
constable forced innkeepers to lodge guests they did not want to

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

89 Eng. Rep. 566, 566 (1691).
Id. (citations omitted).
"Que fueront ore too many innes in le ville." 81 Eng. Rep. 842, 842 (1623).
"Ceo est inn de necessity." Id.
Newton v. Trigg, 89 Eng. Rep. 566, 566 (1691).
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lodge, but it seems likely he derived his understanding from statements made after 1600 like those of Dalton in Countrey Justice. 198
By the end of the seventeenth century, then, the court viewed
innkeeping as a business quite different from other businesses-one
which the authorities could compel to serve the public.
IV. CONCLUSION

An inn is a refuge from the perilous world outside, and its
obligation to serve the public might logically have flowed from the
public's need and desire for access to it. But life does not always
follow logic. Dangers outside the inn were less significant than the
dangers within, and this factor played an important role in the
origins of the duty to serve the public.
The duty to serve the public was incidental to the innkeeper's
liability for losses of his lodgers. That liability derived from Roman
law which was compatible with the victim compensation provisions
of the Statute of Winchester. It also encouraged innkeepers to keep
their lodgers safe during the period after the Black Death when
people perceived lawlessness around them. Exceptions to strict
liability arose to assist travelers in finding lodging where there was
no inn or the inn was crowded. These exceptions in turn led to the
duty of the innkeeper to serve those for whom there was room. This
duty also served a national interest by protecting trade and encouraging alien traders.
The link between strict liability and the obligation to serve the
public has long been severed. Limitations on liability now appear in
bold )etters on your hotel room door. But some laws endure long
after their original rationale has disappeared because they have
proved to be valuable for other reasons. The common-law service
obligations of inns fulfill different functions today than at their
inception. The main significance of the right of access today is to
protect against discrimination. Just as English law responded to the
problems of its time by departing from Roman rules, so law today
must respond to current realities. The obligation to serve the public
extended from the inn to include the common carrier,199 and today
concern for whether there is or ought to be a right of public access
extends to the newest of innovations like the Internet and broadband communications. Ancient rules of law provide a comfortable
form with which to address modern problems. It is up to us to de198. DALTON, supra note 179, at 26.
199. Jackson v. Rogers, 89 Eng. Rep. 968, 968 (1683) (holding action on the case
lies for common carrier's failure to carry goods, analogizing to innkeeper's duty to
accept guests).
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termine whether and in what circumstances the old rule should be
given current meaning.
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